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Abstract 
The purpose of this work project is to analyze the concept of commoditization in the 
information technology industry (IT). It is based on a case study that describes how IBM, 
a successful company for more than seventy years, was affected by the commoditization 
of the personal computer segment in the early 1990s and the strategic transformation 
undertook by the company to overcome this problem. Furthermore, it is also emphasized 
IBM’s decisions to exit commoditized segments and to shift its portfolio towards services 
and software, due to their major contribution in bringing the company back to its leading 
position in the marketplace.  
Keywords: IBM, Strategy, Commoditization, Information Technology Industry. 
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Case Narrative 
1. The rise of the Big Blue (1910-1970s)  
On June 1911, three American companies - the Tabulating Machine Company, the 
International Time Recording Company and the Computing Scale Company – decided to 
merge to form the Computing Tabulating Recording Company (CTR). In 1914, Thomas 
J. Watson joined the company as general manager and one year later he became CTR’s 
Chief Executive Officer (Nebeker, 2009). Although the tabulating business was a small 
and unprofitable segment for the company, Watson recognized that the expansion of the 
economy, the increasing sophistication of the accounting processes and complexity of the 
organizations would led to a significant increase in the demand for punched card 
tabulators, one of the early information-processing technologies (see Exhibit 1 for more 
information about the punched card tabulator; Kim and Mauborgne, 2005).   
Furthermore, very early on its history, CTR expanded its offices and plants across the 
United States. This domestic expansion was just the beginning of an internationalization 
process through South America, Europe, Asia and Australia. As a result of this intense 
period of international expansion, the company decided to change its name to 
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) in 1924 (Tung, 2001).  
The end of the 1930s and the early 1940s were a period of significant progress in the 
electronic computing area, particularly in the United States where the government 
supported the development of information-processing-related projects. Those projects 
involved both U.S. universities and firms such as National Cash Register, General 
Electric and International Business Machines Corporation, creating a base of knowledge, 
critical mass skills and experiences that were fundamental to the development of the first 
digital computers immediately after the end of the World War II (Chandler and Cortada, 
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2000). In fact, in 1946 it was commercialized the first digital computer, a mainframe 
called ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer) that was developed by 
Presper Eckert and John Mauchly (Burg, 2001). 
Even though IBM was part of the first projects to produce digital computers (Chandler 
and Cortada, 2000), it focused on developing large electronic business calculators. Thus, 
it was only in 1953 that IBM entered the digital computing business with the development 
of the IBM 701 (Yost, 2005). During this decade it also introduced IBM 650 Magnetic 
Drum Calculator, an intermediate size computer that became known as “the Model T of 
computers” due to its enormous success in the 1950s. IBM was not a first mover in digital 
computing, but it rapidly established itself as the world market leader in computer 
business (see Exhibit 2 for the evolution of the market shares in electronic data-
processing equipment). This was a result of the company’s continuous investment in 
R&D to create new products, its exceptional marketing competence and its excellent sales 
teams and management structures (Mowery and Nelson, 1999).  
IBM’s dominant position was conserved during the following decades with the 
company’s successive innovations in computing. One of these innovations came in 1964 
when IBM announced the System/360, a family of computer systems based on the 
principles of compatibility and scalability. For the first time, a group of different-sized 
machines could run the same software and any of the wide range of IBM peripheral 
equipment such as printers, disk drives and memory units could be plug into without 
changing the whole installation (Ferguson and Morris, 1994). In addition, clients might 
move across the entire range of System/360 machines, as their processing needs increase. 
Although mainframe computers were highly used by large public and private 
organizations to manage the vast amounts of data, it had emerged the idea that the 
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computers could serve the needs of smaller enterprises that did not need such powerful 
machines. Consequently, in 1960 the Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) introduced 
the first minicomputer, the PDP 1 (Morris, 2001). IBM, along with other companies such 
as Data General and Prime Computer, entered the minicomputer market with a line of 
products that became known as the midrange system (Lindgren, 2001). 
Hence, during these decades IBM made fundamental contributions to the computer 
industry and played an important role in replacing the traditional electro-mechanical data 
processing machines for financial, manufacturing, engineering and other enterprise 
applications that helped firms to increase their performance (Yost, 2005).  
 
2. The IBM PC: a Trojan horse inside Big Blue walls 
The microprocessor revolution and the rise of the personal computer 
The advances in the microelectronics led to the development of the first microprocessor 
in 1971, the Intel 4004. In the following years other companies namely the National 
Semiconductor and Motorola commercialize their own microprocessors. This innovation 
gave the possibility to create the first commercially available microcomputer, the Altair, 
which was launched by MITS in 1974.  Two years later Apple introduced Apple I and in 
1977 Apple II. In this same year, Commodore announced the Personal Executive 
Terminal (PET) and Tandy the TRS-80 (Estabrooks, 1995). By 1980, these three 
companies were leading the microcomputer market, Tandy with twenty-five percent of 
market share, Commodore with twenty-three and Apple with seventeen percent of share 
(see Exhibit 3).  
Though IBM was successfully leading the mainframe market in 1980 (see Exhibit 4), it 
started to be pressured “from inside and outside the company to develop a more effective 
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strategy for the rapidly growing personal computer marketplace” (Estabrooks, 1995: 60). 
Consequently, it set up an independent design group to develop the company’s version of 
microcomputer, the IBM PC, which was introduced in the market in 1981. In this process 
IBM contracted out the microprocessor to Intel and the operating system to Microsoft, 
breaking with the company’s traditional strategy of self-developing the essential 
components of its products or protecting them through proprietary standards. Hence, IBM 
allowed Intel and Microsoft to sell or license the microprocessor and operating system to 
other PC manufacturers (Dolata, 2013). 
This decision to adopt an open architecture can be explained by the pressure to get IBM’s 
first microcomputer ready to sell on the market, the company’s lack of insight into the 
importance that the PC would assume in the information-technology industry and IBM’s 
antitrust battle with the Justice Department (Mills and Friesen, 1996), which began in 
1968 and “created a legacy of competitive caution within IBM - particularly against 
smaller firms” (Ferguson and Morris, 1994: 88).  
IBM entered the Personal Computer as a second mover, nevertheless the company soon 
dominate this new market segment and established a leading position concomitantly in 
the whole hardware sector – mainframes, minicomputers, microcomputers (PCs) and 
peripherals (see Exhibit 5 for IBM’s market share in 1985).   
 
Commoditization 
The introduction of the PC in the market came with a set of challenges for IBM. Firstly, 
the decision to use an operating system and a microprocessor from third parties opened 
opportunities for numerous computer manufacturers to develop IBM-compatible PCs 
(clones) and to sell them at lower prices in a highly competitive market (Dolata, 2013). 
Secondly, IBM was not used to commercialize such a high-volume low-margin product 
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and its traditional customer base consisted of management information systems engineers 
and not small businesses and individuals (Mills and Friesen, 1996). Thirdly, there was 
also an important change in the distribution channels with IBM’s decision to subcontract 
the sales of the personal computers to retailers such as Computerland and Sears Business 
Centers (Ferguson and Morris, 1994).  
As a result, a strategy that seemed to work until the mid-1980s was revealing its problems.  
The PC’s open architecture led to a rapidly spread of clone manufacturers such as 
Compaq and Dell. These companies were able to produce PCs in a shorter period of time 
and sell them at lower prices (Estabrooks, 1995). As the competition increased and 
customer became more informed and incurred relatively low costs to change suppliers, 
the personal computer value dropped and it progressively became a commoditized 
segment in IBM’s portfolio (Reimann et al., 2010). At this point it was clear that the 
company had lost control over a market that once it completely dominated.  
 
3. Trapped: the financial impact of PC commoditization 
In the early 1990s, IBM was experiencing severe difficulties. The USA economy went 
into recession at the end of the 1980s. It was not a severe downturn but to some extent it 
affected negatively the IT industry due to the fact that many corporations decided to 
postpone their investments as a way to protect themselves from this period of uncertainty 
(Ward, 2004). IBM’s sales revenues were decreasing in its most important segment, the 
hardware, and the company’s costs in all segments were increasing (see Exhibit 6 for 
IBM’s financials). Consequently, IBM reported losses for the first time in three 
consecutive years (1991-1993) including an $8.1 billion deficit in 1993, the largest annual 
loss in US corporate history (see Exhibit 7 to analyze the net income of the leading 
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American PC manufacturers; Lazonick, 2010). Furthermore, IBM’s stock price dropped 
significantly, especially in 1993 (see Exhibit 8 for the company’s stock price evolution), 
there was a cut in the dividend payment (see Exhibit 9) and a credit downgrading from 
AAA to AA- by Standard & Poors (Ward, 2004).    
In 1993 John Akers, the IBM’s CEO for the last eight years, announced his retirement. 
Therefore, the company created a committee to search for a candidate to the position left 
by Akers and according to Jim Burke, head of this committee, the company needed an 
effective leader more than a technologist (Gerstner, 2003). On the first of April 1993, 
Louis Gerstner became officially the company’s CEO - “I said yes. In retrospect, it’s 
almost hard for me to remember why. I supposed it was some of Jim Burke’s patriotism 
and some of Tom Murphy’s arguments playing to my gluttony for world-class challenges. 
At any rate, we shook hands and agreed to work out a financial package” (Gerstner, 2003: 
17). 
 
4. Strategic Transformation: fighting back the commoditization trap 
We need leadership and a sense of direction and momentum, not just from me but from 
all of us. I don’t want to see a lot of prophets of doom around here. I want can-do people 
looking for short-term victories and long-term excitement. 
Louis Gerstner, CEO, International Business Machines Corporation, 1993. 
 
Gerstner (2003) defined that IBM’s strategy would be transforming the company into the 
foremost integrator of technologies to help its customers envision, design and build end-
to-end solutions. So, in 1993 IBM began “one of the largest reengineering projects ever 
undertaken by a multinational corporation” (Gerstner, 2003: 63-64) that involved a 
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cultural and organizational transformation (see Exhibit 10a for IBM’s ninety-day 
priorities and Exhibit 10b for Gerstner’s expectations). 
Despite the increasing pressure to split IBM into several operating units, the company’s 
CEO argued that “given IBM’s scale and broad-based capabilities, and the trajectories of 
the information technology industry, it would have been insane to destroy its unique 
competitive advantage and turn IBM into a group of individual component suppliers” 
(Gerstner, 2003: 61). Hence, he decided to keep the company together, a new direction 
that became known as “One IBM” (Austin and Nolan, 2000).  
In order to solve the company’s precarious financial situation and get costs under 
control, Jerry York was hired. As a result, “York and Gerstner approved layoffs of over 
75,000 employees in the early 1993” (Applegate et al., 2005: 6), they ended with the 
“complex transfer pricing system that led IBM divisions to expend effort on internal 
negotiations and accounting games” and “sold off some non-core business, including the 
Federal Systems Company” (Austin and Nolan, 2000: 10). Furthermore, IBM had one of 
the most complex structures in the world with twenty separated business units and twenty-
five data centers (Gesmin et al., 2011). Therefore, Louis Gerstner pulled divisions into 
larger business groups and formed the Corporate Executive Committee (CEC), whose 
responsibility was focusing on the company’s corporate strategy and its turnaround, and 
created the Worldwide Management Council (WMC) that aimed to define and 
implement international strategies and operations. Moreover the sales divisions, which 
used to be organized by geography and product, were integrated into global sales teams 
(Applegate et al., 2005) and each of them was divided into customer relationship 
managers and product specialists (Austin and Nolan, 2000). In addition, Gerstner 
intended to rebuild IBM as a customer-oriented organization. Hence, he assigned 
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customer accounts to each team and challenged them to visit their biggest customers in 
the following few months. The purpose of these visits was to encourage executives to 
listen to customer’s problems and complaints and find ways to satisfy their needs and 
requirements (Harreld et al., 2007).   
By 1993, “IBM had more than seventy ad agencies, each working on its own and without 
any central coordination” (Gerstner, 2003: 88). In order to create one common brand 
message for all IBM products and services around the world, the company consolidated 
its advertising agencies into a single one, Ogilvy & Mather (DiCarlo, 2002). 
One year later, it was also instituted a significant change in the company’s compensation 
system. Firstly, employee compensation was tied to the performance of the firm rather 
than exclusively to a particular division or unit performance. Secondly, it was introduced 
the variable pay to emphasize that “if the company could pull off its turnaround, each and 
every one of them would share in the rewards” (Gerstner, 2003: 101). Thirdly, stock 
options were offered to IBMers in order to reinforce the idea that compensation would be 
based on the performance of the company and workers interests would be aligned with 
those of shareholders by tying performance to share price. Lastly, IBM benefits programs 
were cut back (Gerstner, 2003). 
Additionally, there was a strategic transformation in the company’s portfolio (see 
Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 11 for a comparison of IBM’s position in the market in 1985 and 
in 1996) as it was emerging the idea that “over the next decade, customers would 
increasingly value companies that could provide solutions – solutions that integrated 
technology from various suppliers and, more important, integrated technology into the 
processes of an enterprise” (Gerstner, 2003: 123). Furthermore, with the commoditization 
of one of IBM’s most important segments - the hardware – the company needed to move 
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its portfolio into a more balanced range of high-value offerings. For IBM it meant that 
the company would not only focus on growing the services and software businesses, 
but it would also divest “low-margin product lines and technologies like memory chips, 
technology components, printers, displays and personal computers” (Kralingen, 2010). 
Hence, to reinforce its position in the software business, IBM acquired two important 
software companies, first Lotus Development Corp in 1995 and nine months later Tivoli 
Systems (Geisst, 2006).  
Finally, at a time when most corporations underestimated the value and importance of the 
Internet, IBM defined that e-business would be its new growth strategy (Applegate et al., 
2005). 
 
Moving ahead: from a manufacturing to a services company 
The new century brought a transition in IBM's leadership, Louis Gerstner was replaced 
by Samuel J. Palmisano, who became IBM’s chief executive officer in 2002 (Lyons, 
2005). In this same year, IBM purchased PwC Consulting aiming to have the necessary 
resources and capabilities to offer its customer integrated business solutions through the 
new business unit that was created - IBM Business Consulting Services (Kirkpatrick, 
2004). Additionally, in an attempt to focus on more profitable segments, IBM sold off its 
disk drive manufacturing business to Hitachi in 2002 and its PC business to Lenovo, the 
Chinese maker of personal computers, at the end of 2004. Moreover, in 2007 the company 
spin off its printing division to Ricoh due to the intense competition that the company 
was encountering, especially from HP and Xerox (Hill and Jones, 2012).  
These agreements were aligned with the company’s goal to shift its portfolio range from 
the so-called commodity products to services and software business (Exhibit 12 for the 
evolution of the relative importance of each segment in IBM’s revenues). 
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5. Results and prospective 
IBM increased its sales revenues in services and software, which in 2000 were $33 billion 
and $12.5 billion respectively (see Exhibit 6 for the evolution of sales revenues in each 
segment). In addition, IBM regained its profitability after reporting losses for three 
consecutive years (see Exhibit 7) and in just two years the company was able to recover 
from the significant drop in its stock share price (see Exhibit 8; Lazonick, 2010). The 
company changed the mix of its business from hardware to software and services and is 
focused on business intelligence and analytics, service-oriented architecture and cloud 
computing. Moreover IBM, as a globally integrated enterprise, is leveraging its scale to 
capture new growth opportunities through the company’s Smarter Planet initiative.  
Virginia Rometty, IBM’s Chairwoman and Chief Executive Officer, summarizes the 
company’s past and future challenges:  
Today, another new wave is sweeping in — powered by Big Data, 
analytics, mobile, social and cloud. We anticipated this several years ago 
with our point of view on building a Smarter Planet - a world that was 
becoming instrumented, interconnected and intelligent. Now, the IT 
environment is moving from monolithic applications to dynamic services; 
from structured data at rest to unstructured data in motion; from PCs to 
unprecedented numbers and kinds of devices; from stable to unpredictable 
workloads; from static infrastructure to cloud services; and from 
proprietary standards to open innovation. This shift plays strongly to 
IBM’s historic position in enterprise computing. So we are, as we have so 
often done in the past, reshaping our investment, innovation and market 
strategies to lead. (IBM, 2012) 
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6. Appendices 
 
Exhibit 1 - Punched Card Tabulator 
 
The punched card tabulator was invented by 
Herman Hollerith to assist in processing data for 
the 1890 U.S. Census. This machine collected and 
counted data more rapidly and accurately than the 
manual processes. Soon it started being used in 
businesses and for nearly a century it played an 
important role in helping organizations dealing 
with inventory and accounting processes. 
 
 
Source: Aspray, William (Ed.), Computing Before 
Computers, Iowa State University Press, ISBN 0-8138 
0047-1 (1990), Chapter 4. 
 
Exhibit 2 - Installed Base of Electronic Data-Processing Equipment: Market Share U.S. 
(% of the Retail Sales Value) 
Year IBM Sperry Rand Honeywell RCA Burroughs CDC 
1955 56.1 38.5 - 5.1 - - 
1957 78.5 16.3 0.3 0.8 3.9 - 
1959 74.5 17.8 1.2 1.4 4.2 - 
1961 69.3 15.5 2.0 3.0 2.6 2.2 
1963 69.8 11.2 1.8 3.5 2.6 4.0 
1965 65.3 12.1 3.8 2.8 3.6 5.4 
1967 68.1 10.6 4.7 3.2 2.9 5.7 
 
Source: Honeywell, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Civil Action 4-67, Civ. 138 US District Court, 4th Dist. Minn. 
 
Exhibit 3 – Microcomputers: Worldwide Shipments in 1980 
Company Volume (Units) Percent (%) 
1. Tandy-Radio Shack 111,000 25 
2. Commodore 102,120 23 
3. Apple 75,480 17 
4. Hewlett-Packard 
 
26,640 
 
6 
 
 
Source: International Data Corporation 1981 Computer Industry Briefing Session, p.D-8. 
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Exhibit 4 - Computer Mainframe: Worldwide Shipments in 1980 
Company Revenues ($millions) Percent (%) 
1. IBM 10,650 62.4 
2. Sperry Univac 1,410 8.3 
3. Burroughs 1,000 5.9 
4. NCR 
 
480 
 
2.8 
 
 
Source: International Data Corporation 1981 Computer Industry Briefing Session, p.C-3. 
 
Exhibit 5 – Top Four Companies: Market share (%) in 1985 
Rank 
Mainframes Minicomputers 
PCs 
 (Microcomputers) 
Peripherals 
Firm % Firm % Firm % Firm % 
1 IBM 59.8 IBM 34.2 IBM 46.7 IBM 48.0 
2 Sperry Rand 8.1 Digital 15.6 Apple 13.6 Digital 10.6 
3 Fujitsu 6.9 HP 10.3 Olivetti 7.5 Burroughs 6.1 
4 NEC 5.2 Wang 8.5 Tandy 6.8 Xerox 5.9 
 
Source: Chandler, 2001: 118-8 and 223-4. 
 
Exhibit 6 – IBM’s Financials ($millions)  
 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Revenue             
Services 4,425 11,536 11,322 14,987 16,936 22,310 28,916 33,152 42,635 48,247 55,128 59,453 
Hardware 21,788 38,520 43,959 33,755 32,344 36,634 35,419 34,470 28,239 22,499 
38,300 43,014 
Software - - 9,952 11,103 11,346 11,426 11,863 12,598 14,311 18,204 
Financing - - 3,785 4,678 3,425 3,054 2,877 3,465 2,826 2,379 2,331 2,040 
Other - - - - - 2,523 2,592 1,404 1,120 94 - - 
Total Rev. 26,213 50,056 69,018 64,523 64,051 75,947 81,667 85,089 89,131 91,423 95,758 104,507 
Cost             
Services 2,181 4,689 6,617 9,481 11,404 16,270 21,125 24,309 31,903 34,972 37,146 39,166 
Hardware 7,968 14,911 19,401 19,698 21,300 22,888 24,214 24,207 20,401 14,175 
13,606 13,956 
Software - - 3,126 3,924 4,680 2,946 2,260 2,283 1,927 2,693 
Financing - 1,503 1,579 1,966 1,384 1,481 1,494 1,965 1,248 1,182 1,220 1,087 
Other - - - - - 1,823 1,702 747 634 107 - - 
Total Cost 10,149 21,103 30,723 35,069 38,768 45,408 50,795 53,511 56,113 53,129 51,973 54,209 
Net 
Income 
3,562 6,555 6,020 -4925 3,020 5,429 6,328 8,093 7,583 9,492 13,425 16,604 
 
Note: In the first quarter of 2007, the company changed the presentation of revenue and cost in the 
Consolidated Statement of Earnings to reflect the categories of Services, Sales and Financing.   
Source: IBM Annual Reports. 
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Exhibit 7 – Net Income for the Leading American PC Manufacturers ($millions) 
 
 
Note: From 1991 to 1993 IBM reported losses that totaled $15.9 billion.  
Source: Annual Reports. 
 
Exhibit 8 – IBM‘s Stock Price Evolution (USD) 
 
        Source: Yahoo Finance. 
 
Exhibit 9 – IBM’s Dividend Payment (USD) 
Period 1985-88 1989-92 
Feb/May 
93 
Aug/Nov 
93 
1994-95 1996 1997 1998 
Value 0.275 0.3025 0.135 0.0625 0.0625 0.0875 0.10 0.11 
 
Source: Yahoo Finance. 
Year IBM Hewlett-Packard Apple Compaq Dell 
1990 5967 739 475 455 27 
1991 -2861 755 310 131 51 
1992 -4965 549 530 213 102 
1993 -8101 1177 87 462 -36 
1994 3021 1599 310 988 149 
1995 4178 2433 424 893 272 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
S TO C K  P R I C E  
USD 
   
16 
 
Exhibit 10a - IBM’s Ninety-Day Priorities 
 Stop hemorrhaging cash. The company was close to running out of money. 
 Make sure it would be profitable in 1994.  
 Develop and implement a key customer strategy for 1993. 
 Finish right-sizing by the beginning of the third quarter. 
 Develop and intermediate-term business strategy. 
Source: Adapted from Louis Gerstner, “Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance?”, pp. 24-25. 
 
Exhibit 10b – Gerstner’s Expectations 
 Redefine IBM and its priorities starting with the customer. 
 Give IBM’s laboratories free rein and deliver open, distributed, user-based solutions. 
 Recommit to quality, be easier to work with and reestablish a leadership position. 
 Listen to customers and deliver the performance expected. 
Source: Adapted from Louis Gerstner, “Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance?”, pp. 47-48. 
 
Exhibit 11 – Top Four Companies: Market Share (%) in 1996 
Rank 
Mainframes Minicomputers 
PCs 
(Microcomputers) 
Peripherals Services 
Firm % Firm % Firm % Firm % Firm % 
1 IBM 27.2 IBM 27.5 IBM 16.2 IBM 18.4 IBM 28.9 
2 Fujitsu 25.8 HP 15.9 Compaq 14.1 HP 17.9 EDS 18.3 
3 NEC 19.7 Compaq 14.4 Fujitsu 12.3 Seagate 14.0 HP 12.0 
4 Hitachi 9.4 NEC 9.1 Toshiba 9.9 Canon 12.0 Digital 7.6 
 
Source: Chandler, 2001: 118-8 and 223-4. 
 
Exhibit 12 – Relative Importance of Each Segment in the Company's Revenues (%) 
 1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 
Services 16.88 23.05 16.40 23.23 26.44 29.38 35.41 38.96 47.83 52.79 57.57 56.89 
Hardware 83.12 76.95 63.69 52.31 50.50 48.24 43.37 40.51 31.68 24.60 
40.00 41.16 
Software - - 14.42 17.21 17.71 15.04 14.53 14.80 16.06 19.91 
Financing - - 5.49 7.25 5.35 4.02 3.52 4,08 3.17 2.60 2.43 1.95 
Other - - - - - 3.32 3.17 1.65 1.26 0.10 - - 
 
Note: In the first quarter of 2007, the company changed the presentation of revenue and cost in the 
Consolidated Statement of Earnings to reflect the categories of Services, Sales and Financing. 
Source: IBM Annual Reports. 
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Discussion Questions 
I. What accounted for IBM’s decline in the early 1990s? To what extent was IBM’s 
failure a result of its strategy? 
II. Explain the commoditization concept introduced in the case. What were the strategies 
that IBM adopted to deal with it? In your opinion what other strategies could have been 
implemented?  
III. Develop a SWOT analysis regarding IBM’s current situation.  
 
 
 
Teaching Note 
Despite the large number of studies about IBM, most of them were developed through 
the perspective of strategy formulation and implementation, leadership and managing 
organizational change. In fact, these are all important aspects to be analyzed and this work 
also addresses some of them. Nevertheless, the relevance of this case study is reflected in 
the way the concept of commoditization is emphasized and its connection with IBM’s 
crisis in the early 1990s, which is an approach that has not been explored in previous 
works.  
Therefore, this case study could be an interesting tool to introduce students to the concept 
of commoditization, explore how it can affect the success of a corporation and analyze 
the possible strategies that can be adopted to overcome this problem, in courses such as 
(Corporate) Strategy, Consulting, Leadership and Change Management.  
 
 
   
18 
 
Discussion Note 
I. What accounted for IBM’s decline in the early 1990s? To what extent was IBM’s 
failure a result of its strategy? 
There are both endogenous and exogenous factors that were responsible for the decline 
of IBM in the early 1990s. An economic recession affected the world major economies 
(Applegate and Harreld, 2009) and this situation influenced negatively the demand for IT 
products and services, due to the fact that during the periods of uncertainty corporations 
are in general less willing to make large investments (Ward, 2004).  
Internally, IBM’s decision to build the PC on the basis of an open architecture and without 
controlling the distribution channels enabled other firms to offer equivalent technologies. 
The main result was IBM’s lack of control over the PC market and its commoditization 
(Samuelson, 2006).With the significant increase in competition and fierce price wars that 
emerged, customers started to choose personal computers mainly based on price and 
companies’ profits shrank.  
Contrary to IBM, its main competitors ran very lean operations and operated more 
efficiently (low-cost manufacturers). In 1992, the IBM cost disadvantage was about 
US$200 to US$1,000 per PC (Wong, 1994). Furthermore, IBM made a market analysis 
mistake by underestimating the importance that the personal computer would have in the 
information-technology industry. Additionally, due to the company’s size, complexity 
and its excessive confidence, based on the great success that the company achieved 
during the previous decades, IBM became inflexible, preoccupied with its own view of 
the world, it moved too slowly and it lost touch with customers. 
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Thus we can conclude that along with the economic recession, the company’s strategy 
and the decisions that were made around the PC were responsible for the company’s 
failure in the early 1990s.  
 
II. Explain the commoditization concept introduced in the case. What were the 
strategies that IBM adopted to deal with it? In your opinion what other strategies 
could have been implemented?  
According to Andrew Holmes (2008) commoditization is a natural business process that 
started long ago on the production lines of the factories of Northern England and spread 
to several industries such as telecommunications, airlines or information technology (IT) 
industries. Regarding the history of IT industry, Carr (2003) argued that in each stage of 
its development, there was greater standardization of technology and homogenization of 
its functionalities. He also defended that it has been characterized by an increasing 
interconnectivity and interoperability. The combination of these factors have led to the 
commoditization of certain segments in this industry, which means that “product 
differentiation is difficult, customer loyalty and brand values are low, and sustainable 
advantage comes primarily from cost (and often quality) leadership” (Weil, 1996).  
As it is described in the case, in the mid-1980s the PC became increasingly cheap and 
less distinguishable among different manufacturers, customers could easily switch 
between suppliers, the technical replication cycle got shorter and competition was based 
on prices. The PC became a commoditized business.  
Hence, to overcome this problem IBM designed and implemented a strategic 
transformation that led the company to move from a computer supplier to a solutions 
provider. It remixed its business by exiting commoditized segments and strengthening its 
position in high value and relationship intensive segments of the industry – services and 
software. It purchased Lotus Development Corporation, Tivoli Systems and PwC 
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Consulting. Through these acquisitions, IBM got the necessary capabilities and resources 
to explore the software segment and provide integrated business solutions to its 
customers. Furthermore, the company’s decision to sell its loss-making PC division to 
Lenovo, the disk drive business to Hitachi and the printing division to Ricoh were 
particularly important to the reduction of the company’s exposure to commoditized 
business. Additionally, IBM believed that the Internet would be a “powerful integrating 
platform for doing business inside a company and across business networks” (Applegate 
and Harreld, 2009: 4). Therefore, it was the first business-to-business (B2B) company to 
incorporate the Internet in its strategy. This whole transformation reshaped IBM’s culture 
and enhanced the company’s efficiency with major changes in its organizational structure 
and in the way most processes were carried out. 
Regarding the other possible strategies IBM could have maintained its presence in the 
hardware business by adopting a strategy of product differentiation, similar to Apple’s 
approach. Hence, in order to differentiate from PC clones and regain profitability from 
ailing business units, IBM would need to design and manufacture products with high 
standards of quality; invest on the uniqueness of their functionalities, features and 
services; commercialize them mainly through  the company’s own distribution channels 
and keeping control over their key components. The combination of these elements with 
one of its most important intangible asset - a strong brand reputation – would enable the 
company to provide customers with a superior experience and satisfy their needs and 
expectations by offering products that clients would highly value and consequently would 
be willing to pay more for them. However, this would mean undermining the hardware 
and software compatibility around the IBM PC standard platform. The market would not 
tolerate such a move, as can be demonstrated by one natural experiment. IBM tried to 
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move in that direction in the early 1990s, launching the Micro Chanel Architecture 
(MCA) architecture, a new microprocessor (PowerPC) and a new operating system 
(OS/2). This move to proprietary platforms was not followed by the market for PCs, 
where clones already dominated (Whittaker, 2004). 
 
III. Develop a SWOT analysis regarding IBM’s current situation. 
The SWOT analysis is an important tool to identify internal and external factors that can 
affect positively or negatively the success of a company by analyzing its strengths, 
weaknesses, market opportunities and potential threats (Ferrell and Hartline, 2012).   
Main Strengths 
IBM has built a strong brand status worldwide. It has consistently ranked as one of the 
world’s most innovative, profitable, and sustainable brands. As a result, it is perceived as 
a technological leader compared to its competitors. This reputation certainly influences 
consumers’ buying decisions towards the acquisition of IBM’s products and services and 
reinforces its image (Interbrand, 2012).   
To sustain this reputation and its position in the market, IBM spends over $6 billion a 
year for R&D to focus on high-growth and high-value opportunities. These investments 
have enabled the company to develop key innovations and to maintain U.S. patent 
leadership for twenty consecutive years.  
Additionally, over the last thirteen years, IBM has acquired more than one hundred and 
forty companies in strategic areas such as analytics, cloud, security and commerce. These 
acquisitions have enabled the company to strengthen its leading position in software and 
consulting businesses and to reinforce its competency in acquisitions (IBM, 2012).  
Moreover, IBM has a diversified portfolio that includes hardware, software and services. 
This diversification has led the company to explore the higher profitability of software 
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and services and protect itself from the negative trends in hardware market by adjusting 
the importance that each segment assumes in the company’s portfolio. Furthermore, the 
company has the possibility to combine in its offerings a mix of hardware, software and 
services; and consequently provide customer with a wide range of solutions that satisfy 
their needs and requirements (IBM, 2012).  
Main Weaknesses 
Due to its size and complexity IBM’s development cycles tend to be longer than its 
competitors, which implies that the company takes more time to react and respond to 
customers’ needs and expectations as well as to the industry fluctuations (Gerstner, 2003). 
Although the dimension of a company and its resources are considered important, they 
are no longer the determinants of success. Instead, innovation, flexibility and adaptability 
stand out as the most important attributes to succeed (Adams and Brock, 2004).  
Main Opportunities 
IBM can benefit significantly from exploring new cooperative relationships with local 
institutions and corporations in the places where the company plans to enter and even 
where it is already operating. For instance, by using global partnerships in Africa, IBM 
has been able to won strategic contracts that facilitate the company’s entrance and 
expansion in regional markets (Frier, 2013).  
Furthermore, today innovation is predominantly the product of a collaborative process 
that involves customers, institutions and even other firms. In fact, in hardware IBM has 
co-developed with Sony and Toshiba. In software it has embraced with Linux and other 
open-source software, which has given IBM new platforms to build some of their high-
growth applications. These processes of collaboration have led the industry to grow faster 
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and helped the company to replace the profits lost to commoditization (Cravens and 
Pierce, 2012). 
Moreover, IBM has significantly benefited from its investments in emerging markets 
with high growth potential, such as India, Brazil, China, Russia and more recently Africa. 
Hence, the company sees a great opportunity in reinforcing its position in these markets 
and continuing its geographic expansion to other emerging countries, where it has the 
chance to explore new sources of growth, enhance its capacity, develop talent and deepen 
its R&D capabilities (IBM, 2012).  
Finally, by developing a close relationship with customers, IBM can get insights on 
customers’ needs and on the future of the industry. Thus, more than be just a supplier 
IBM should be a partner (Applegate and Harreld, 2009). 
Main Threats 
IBM is facing intense competition not only from large players, but also from an 
increasing number of small and highly specialized firms. In the consulting and 
outsourcing industry it competes with Electronic Data Services (EDS), Accenture, 
Capgemini and low-priced outsourcing companies, especially Indian firms such as Tata 
Consulting Services, Wipro and Infosys. In hardware and software business IBM faces 
competition from Hewlett-Packard, Dell, Sun Microsystems, Oracle and Microsoft (Hill 
and Jones, 2012). 
Other important threat is the economic crisis that began in 2007 and had a negative 
impact in some economies that, even today, are struggling to grow. This situation will 
continue to affect IBM’s revenues due to the fact that sales depend on institutions and 
companies’ willingness to invest in IT infrastructures, which is normally a decision that 
is postponed during periods of slow economic growth (Ward, 2004). 
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Conclusion 
This case study demonstrates that the commoditization of a particular segment included 
in the portfolio of a corporation can pose a serious threat to its survival in the industry 
where it operates. In fact, in the early 1990s IBM was living the most severe crisis in its 
history, which was triggered mainly by the commoditization of the personal computer. 
To overcome this situation, IBM reduced its exposure to commoditized segments, 
reshaped the company’s efficiency with major changes in the company’s organizational 
structure and in the way most processes were carried out.  Since then, IBM has focused  
on higher-margin business (services and software) and it has continued to innovate and 
reinvent products and services to satisfy demanding customers with sophisticated needs 
and high expectations. It has explored new geographic markets and focus on business 
performance and open standards. IBM not only managed to differentiate from its main 
competitors, but it also became competitive and ensured its long-term sustainability by 
transforming itself from a hardware manufacturing firm into a global service provider and 
software company. IBM is a great example of a company that not only survived, but 
thrived and reestablished its leading position in the information technology industry.   
The main lesson we can take from this case study is that commoditization is a serious 
threat that may affect big and small firms in different markets and industries, nevertheless 
it can also be an opportunity for corporations to reinforce their core capabilities, to 
enhance their efficiency and to strengthen their position in the market. Therefore, what is 
really important is that companies prepare themselves to live in a dynamic world, adapt 
to the challenges that cross on their way and have the resources and motivation to make 
the necessary strategic changes in their structure and culture, such as IBM  did.    
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